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Bank Mergers and the Department of Justice's
Horizontal Merger Guidelines: A Critique and
Proposal
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Reserve Board ("Fed") and the Department of
Justice ("DOJ") are two agencies with regulatory jurisdiction over
bank mergers. Both agencies are required by law to review the
competitive impact of proposed merger transactions. Tension exists
between these federal agencies because at times they disagree on
the presence of anticompetitive effects in the post-merger environ-
ment.
This disagreement stems from the fact that bank agencies
such as the Fed tend to advocate bank mergers. In light of past
savings and loan failures, the Fed favors banking consolidations in
order to advance the safety and soundness of the banking indus-
try. Conversely, the DOJ, along with the Federal Trade Commis-
sion ("FTC")' tends to scrutinize mergers more closely.2 As a re-
sult, at times, the Fed will approve a proposed merger and the
acquirer will move forward under the impression that the applica-
tion process is essentially complete. Then, the DOJ will file suit
based on antitrust implications of the merger, or, at a minimum,
delay the transaction based on potential anticompetitiveness in the
post-merger environment.'
, The purpose of this Note is to analyze the approval processes
of the Fed and the DOJ with regard to intramarket bank mergers
1 A statutory exemption precludes the FTC from involvement in banking mergers.
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1988).
2 See Kenneth A. Letzler & Michael B. Mierzewski, Antitrust Policy Poses Greater Bur-
dens for Bank Mergers and Acquisitions, BANKING POLIY REP., Apr. 20, 1992, at 1; David
Balto et al., Recent Developments in Bank Merger Competition Policy, 4 BANKING L. REv. 8, 9
(1992).
3 Examples of this or similar occurrences include the following mergers: Society
Corporation/Ameritrust Company NA; First Hawaiian/First Interstate Hawaiian; Fleet-
Norstar/Bank of New England (where the bank regulatory agency was the FDIC); and
BankAmerica/Security Pacific. The DOJ can delay transactions since it has been granted
the power of an automatic stay by the Bank Merger Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(7)(A)
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992), and the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1849(b)(1)
(1988).
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
by focusing on the DOJ's recently revised Horizontal Merger
Guidelines.4 In order to fully appreciate the magnitude of the
bank merger approval process, Part II discusses, the complex regu-
latory burden unique to banking. Additionally, Part II sets forth
the Fed's concise method of reviewing merger applications. Part
III discusses the DOJ's more complex and intricate method of
review under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Part IV dissects
and examines the Guidelines, a product of joint action between
the DOJ and the FTC, for their positive and negative effects on
the post-merger environment.5 After delineating the merger ap-
proval processes of both the Fed and the DOJ, Part V summarizes
how these agencies disagree and agree with regard to merger stan-
dards.
The overall effect of the revisions to the DOJ's Guidelines is
that the DOJ has abandoned its past rigid position in merger
analysis by explicitly denouncing pure reliance on market structure
as the primary indicator of anticompetitiveness. By moving toward
a more flexible approach in the evaluation of proposed bank
mergers,' the DOJ has increasingly come to resemble the Fed as a
facilitator of banking mergers. Although tension between the DOJ
and the Fed still exists, the extent of their disagreements may
narrow as the DOJ's new Guidelines are applied in a more liberal
fashion than permitted under prior Guidelines. As that happens,
the DOJ's and the Fed's efforts in merger analysis will overlap and
become redundant. Thus, Part VI advocates eliminating that re-
dundancy by vesting exclusive jurisdiction over bank mergers with
the Fed.
4 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 (1992).
5 In the past, the DOJ and the FTC issued separate merger standards. The 1992
Guidelines replace the DOJ's 1984 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823
(1984), and the FTC's 1982 Statement Concerning Horizontal Mergers, reprinted in 4
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,200 (1982); see also Barbara Franklin, Antitrust Guidelines:
Changes are Few, but Potentially Significant, N.Y. LJ., Apr. 9, 1992, at 5 (discussing high-
lighted changes in Merger Guidelines).
6 This flexible approach results from an overall relaxation of merger standards. See
Antitrust Agency Heads Cite Guidelines As Major Administration Accomplishment, 63 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1590, at 584 (Nov. 12, 1992); Arquit Describes Enforcers' Experi-
ence Applying 1992 Horizontal Merger Guides, 63 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
1584, at 426 (Oct. 1, 1992); Justice Department and FTC Issue Horizontal Merger Guidelines,
U.S. Newswire, Apr. 2, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
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II. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING BANK MERGERS
A. Regulatory Agency and Jurisdiction
The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued by the DOJ
and the FTC, discussed at length below, govern mergers across all
industry lines, including bank mergers. However, bank mergers,
unlike mergers in other industries, implicate special considerations
which contribute to the tension between the DOJ and the Fed.7
A primary differentiating feature of the banking, industry is
that banking is heavily regulated by both federal and state agen-
cies.8 Hence, to complete a bank merger, bank executives must
satisfy the requirements of the relevant federal regulatory agency,
which, depending on the circumstances, may be the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC"), the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation ("FDIC"), or the Fed.9 These agencies, along
with the following statutes, govern banking acquisitions and merg-
ers: the Bank Holding Company Act"0 ("BHCA"); the Change in
Bank Control Act;" and the Bank Merger Act ("BMA"). 2 More-
over, bank officials must meet the requirements imposed by the
Clayton Act 3 and" the Sherman Antitrust Act, 4 both of which
are administered by the DOJ.
The circumstances that dictate which banking agency will have
7 See Balto et al., supra note 2, at 10.
Tensions between the Fed and the DOJ have waxed and waned depending on the
type of transaction involved. In the 1980s, bank mergers aimed to extend geographic
markets, resulting in a lesser degree of tension between these agencies. In contrast, the
recent trend of bank mergers focuses on in-market consolidations, which raises the level
of tension between these agencies. Cynthia A. Glassman, Merger Plans Need Careful Antitrust
Analysis, AM. BANKER, June 24, 1992, at 4. This increased tension is explained in that
horizontal mergers have a stronger potential to foreclose competition. which causes the
DOJ much concern. Banks, however, are moving toward horizontal mergers in order to
take advantage of resulting efficiencies which favorably impact their bottom lines.
8 James A. Bernstein, Mergers and Acquisitions: The Legal Hurdles Banks Face in Choos-
ing to Consolidate, 109 BANKING Lj. 205, 206 (1992); see generally THE BANKERS' HANDBOOK
1222-26 (William H. Baughn et al. eds., 1988) (noting various regulations guiding bank-
ing mergers).
9 Bernstein, supra note 8, at 221-23.
10 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
11 12 U.S.C. § 18170) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
12 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
13 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1988). Section 7 is most relevant to bank mergers. See
Bernstein, supra note 8, at 225.
14 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). S6ctions 1 and 2 are most relevant to
bank mergers. See Bernstein, supra note 8, at 225.
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jurisdiction primarily depends on the nature of the transaction in-
volved. Where the proposed transaction is an acquisition, the type
of institution of the target bank is the determining factor. 5 In
the case of a merger, the type of institution that will be formed is
the determining factor.t6 If the entity considering consolidation is
a national or a District bank, then the OCC regulates the pro-
posed transaction.' If the entity is a state non-member, non-Dis-
trict bank, then the FDIC regulates the acquisition." If the entity
is a non-District, state-member insured bank, then the Fed has
jurisdiction. 9
The nature of the transaction (merger or acquisition), howev-
er, does not always determine which federal agency has jurisdic-
tion over the merger. Whenever a bank holding company is a
party to the transaction, the Fed must have jurisdiction under the
BHCA.20 Under the BHCA, the Fed has promulgated Regulation
Y, which requires the Fed's approval for any consolidation involv-
ing bank holding companies except where the merger involves the
consolidation of subsidiary banks of a bank holding company.'
Since most notable bank mergers involve a bank holding company,
this Note will focus on the actions of the Fed as the relevant fed-
eral banking regulatory agency.
B. Banking Statutes
After determining which regulatory agency has jurisdiction,
the appropriate banking statutes must be applied to the transac-
tion.2 2 The BMA mandates that, whenever state-member insured
banks are merging, the Fed must consider the financial and mana-
gerial impact in the post-merger environment.3 The BMA also
requires the regulatory agency to consider the convenience and
15 Bernstein, supra note 8, at 221.
16 Id. at 223.
17 Id. at 222.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 222 n.84.
20 Id. at 222.
21 Id. at 216 n.56, 228: see Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control.
Revision of Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. § 225 (1984).
22 A statute not frequently implicated is the Change in Bank Control Act, which
affords the responsible federal agency the authority to disapprove changes in control of
insured banks. 12 U.S.C. § 18170). This provision has an exemption for bank holding
companies and bank mergers, which are governed by their own statutes. The provision
applies specifically to persons acquiring control of banks. 12 U.S.C. § 18170)(1).
23 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(B).
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needs of the community in evaluating the anticompetitive effects
of the proposed combination.24 As indicated above, the BHCA is
the applicable banking statute that governs consolidations by bank
holding companies. The purpose of this statute is twofold. First,
the statute prohibits the restraint of trade in the banking industry
by regulating banking consolidations.' Second, the statute limits
the scope of a bank holding company's non-banking activities in
order to differentiate between banking and commerce.
C. Banking Consolidations
In completing a bank merger, compliance with the applicable
rules and regulations is a complex and burdensome task. The
process is further complicated because, in addition to meeting the
banking industry's requirements, the DOJ's Merger Guidelines
must also be followed.
Bank merger analysis begins when the applicable bank agency
assumes jurisdiction and commences an examination of the merg-
er application. The bank agency must notify the DOJ of the pro-
posed transaction under the BMA or the BHCA.27 Concomitantly,
the DOJ and the relevant bank agency issue separate opinions
regarding the anticompetitive effects of the merger.2 1
With the recent wave of bank mergers, the docket of joint
Fed and DOJ merger applications has steadily increased. 9 This
onslaught of banking mergers is due to the collapse of interstate
banking barriers under state reciprocity agreements."0 The Doug-
las Amendment to the BHCA prohibits a bank holding company
operating in one state from acquiring a bank in another state
24 Id.; see Bernstein, supra note 8, at 226.
25 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a).
26 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8). Historically, banks were prohibited from engaging in non-
bank activities. Today, the distinction between banking and commerce is, to an extent, a
mere exaggeration since most banks do engage in non-bank financial endeavors through
banking subsidiaries. See Carl Felsenfeld, The Bank Holding Company Act: Has It Lived Its
Lifr?, 38 VILL L. REv. 2 (1993).
27 12 U.S.C. §§ 1828(c)(7)(A), 1849(b)(1).
28 12 U.S.C. §§ 1828(c)(6), 1849(b)(1).
29 See Terry Calvani & W. Todd Miller, Antitrust Analysis of Bank Mergers: Recent Devel-
opments, 9 Rev. Banking & Fin. Serv. No. 13, at 127, 128 (July 1993) (The United States
is "in [the] midst of an ongoing process of bank consolidation."); Margaret Guerin-
Calvert & Janusz Ordover, The 1992 Agency Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the Department
of Justice's Approach to Bank Merger Analysis, 37 ANTITRUST BuLL. 667 (1992) ("The banking
industry is currently undergoing a period of substantial consolidation and reorganiza-
tion.").
30 See Bernstein, supra note 8, at 212.
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unless the second state, by express statute, permits such an acquisi-
tion."
Increasingly, states have adopted reciprocity agreements that
allow a bank holding company from another state to acquire a
bank within their state if the bank holding company's state has a
reciprocal statute. As more and more states have adopted these
agreements, banking mergers have increasingly crossed state bor-
ders. The increasing frequency of banking consolidations across
state lines, in conjunction with the banking crisis and the need for
industry-wide consolidation, 2 has also triggered mergers of banks
within a singular market. Mergers of banks within the same mar-
ket pose antitrust implications.3
31 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1988).
32 The need for large-scale banking consolidation stems from a variety of reasons.
These reasons range from the fact that failing banks can become healthy by merging
into a stronger institution, to the fact that decentralized banking has inhibited United
States banks from competing in the global markets. See Arthur Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big To
Fai Too Few To Serve? The Potential Risks of Nationwide Banking, 77 IOWA L. REV. 957
(1992); see also Felsenfeld, supra note 26, at 24 (noting that no United States bank ranks
in the world's top twenty). An additional reason for the need for banking consolidation
is derived from the fact that until the 1980s, interest payments on deposits were heavily
regulated. As a result, banks were forced to compete on non-price factors such as service
and convenience, which led to extensive branch openings. Accordingly, the banking in-
dustry became plagued by excess capacity; the current trend toward consolidation is a
marked effort to correct this excess. Donald Baker, Searching for an Antitrust Beacon in the
Bank Merger Fog, 37 ANTrrRUSr BULL. 651 (1992).
33 A striking example of such a situation is the BankAmerica/Security Pacific merg-
er, which combined the third and seventh largest bank holding companies in the nation.
Neither the DOJ nor the Fed opposed the merger after the banks agreed to divest 211
branches because such a divestiture would dilute the perceived anticompetitive effects
throughout all relevant geographic markets. See Division Won't Attack Proposed Bank Mergers,
62 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1555, at 284 (Mar. 5, 1992); see also Nevins
D. Baxter, No Red Light Ahead for Mergers, Amf. BANKER, Jan. 14, 1993, at 4 (discussing
BankAmerica/Security Pacific merger); Orders Issued Under Section 3 and 4 of the Bank Hold-
ing Company Act: BankAmerica Corporation, 78 FED. REs. BULL. 338 (1992) (Fed's analysis of
merger); Federal Reserve Board Approves Merger of BankAmerica Corp., Security Pacific, BNA
BANKING DAILY, Mar. 26, 1992, at 1 (the DOJ called the transaction the largest bank
merger in United States history). See generally Orders Issued Under Sections 3 and 4 of the
Bank Holding Company Act: BankAmerica Corporation, 78 FED. RES. BULL. 299 (1992) (dis-
cussing BankAmerica's acquisition of Nevada First Development Corporation).
However, the majority of bank mergers do not take place within the confines of a
single geographic market and, therefore, do not raise antitrust concerns. Rill Says No
Change In Law Is Necessary To Address Megamergers. BANKING POL'Y REP., Oct. 21, 1991, at
5; see also Bank Mergers: Hearings Before the Comm. of Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs.
House of Rep., 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 234 (1991) (statement of James F. Rill, Assistant At-
torney General of the Antitrust Division). Furthermore, merging small banks within a
market does not normally raise antitrust concerns. Indeed, such mergers are encouraged
by both the Fed and the DOJ because they typically provide substantial efficiencies to the
merging banks. Id. See also Division Finds Most Bank Mergers Do Not Create Competitive Prob-
[Vol. 69:4
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Generally, under Regulation Y, the Fed considers three prima-
ry factors in deciding whether to approve a merger application.'
First, the Fed evaluates whether the proposed transaction would
establish a monopoly or significantly lessen competition. 5 Second,
the Fed evaluates the sufficiency of the institution's financial con-
dition as well as the managerial competence and character of the
merged institution."6 Third, the Fed evaluates whether the conve-
nience and needs of the community will be served by the transac-
tion. 7
The Fed analyzes these three considerations using an orga-
nized methodology. Specifically, the Fed's merger process begins
at one of the twelve Federal Reserve Banks by analyzing the appro-
priate geographic market and the relevant product market. 8 This
includes collecting data on shopping and commuting patterns of
consumers within the relevant market and determining their effect
on banking relationships. 9 The Federal Reserve Bank may also'
collect data by conducting telephone surveys and on-site interview-
* ing sessions.40
Next, officials at the Federal Reserve Bank measure pre- and
post-merger environments by calculations made under the
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index ("HHI") .41 This calculation is pri-
marily used to determine whether the proposed transaction falls
within the DOJ's thresholds, and indicates whether the transaction
lems, 62 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1570, at 808 (June 18, 1992) (stating
that the DOJ rarely opposes mergers of small banks in unconcentrated markets); Competi-
tive Factors Dominate First Quarter 1992 Regulatoy Actions. BANKING POL'Y REP., May 4, 1992,
at 10 (stating that more than half of the bank consolidations did not pose
anticompetitive concerns).
Edward C. Ettin, Deputy Director, Division of Research and Statistics, Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System. remarked that banking combinations in urban mar-
kets "could increase considerably without raising any questions about competition under
the antitrust laws or the merger guidelines of the Justice Department." Statement before the
Subcomm. on Treasuy, Postal Service and General Gov't Comm. on Appropriation in the U.S.
Senate, reprinted in 78 FED. R.S. BULL. 262, 263 (1992) [hereinafter Statement].
34 12 C.F.R § 225.13; see Bernstein, supra note 8, at 229.
35 12 C.FR. § 225.13(a).
36 12 C.F.R. § 225.13(b).
37 12 C.F.R. § 225.13(b).
38 Statement, supra note 33, at 263. The Fed analyzes the relevant product market
according to a "cluster of banking services" approach as set forth by the Supreme Court.
See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
39 Statement, supra note 33, at 263.
40 Id.
41 Id.
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will hinder competition in the marketplace." The Fed has discre-
tion under Regulation Y to ignore even a relatively high HHI
where the proposed merger's beneficial effect to the community
clearly outweighs the anticompetitive factors.4"
If, after this analysis, the officials at the Federal Reserve Bank
reach a satisfactory conclusion, the review ceases and the approval
of the merger is issued. However, if the results are unsatisfactory
(including exceeding the DOJ's thresholds), further review will
proceed. This review must be conducted by the Federal Reserve
Board."
Further review includes (1) looking to thrifts as commercial
bank substitutes; (2) analysis of entry as well as analysis of existing
competitors; (3) looking to credit unions, finance companies, and
other supply responses; (4) financial conditions of the merging
firms; (5) overall appraisal of the health of the market; and (6)
the competitive importance of the target bank.45 Lastly, the Fed
has authority to override anticompetitive concerns in an aggregate
"convenience and needs" approach. If the public benefits outweigh
anticompetitive concerns, the merger will proceed. 6
These evaluations, in conjunction with the bank's adherence
to the procedural notice requirements," result in either approval
or rejection by the Fed. As a general rule, a federal bank agency
will not approve a proposed merger where the transaction would
lead to a monopoly or other monopolistic situation, or where such
consolidation would lead to an unreasonable restraint on trade.48
42 Bernstein, supra note 8. at 225. HHI measures market concentration by squaring
the sums of the market share of market participants. HHI can theoretically range from
10.000 (pure monopoly) to a number approaching zero. For banks, total deposits are
considered in market concentration measurement. For example. if four banks in a mar-
ket have market shares of 30%, 30%, 20%, and 20%, respectively, then the HHI would
be calculated as follows: (30x30) + (30x30) + (20x20) + (20x20) = 2600, resulting in an
HHI of 2600 points. See United States v. Society Corp. and Ameritrust Corp., 57 Fed.
Reg. 10,371 (1992).
43 Bernstein, supra note 8, at 226 n.102.
44 Statement, supra note 33, at 263.
45 Id.; see also Baker, supra note 32, at 653 (banking regulators of the 1980s advocat-
ing inclusion of thrifts in product market analysis).
46 Statement, supra note 33, at 264. The Fed's "convenience and needs" defense is
analogous to the DOJ's "failing firms" defense. See infra Part IV.E. However, it is "clear
that the failing company doctrine does not literally apply to bank mergers." Baker, supra
note 32, at 658 (analyzing past and present treatment of "convenience and needs" doc-
trine by courts).
47 Notice requirements dictate the timing of merger applications. 12 U.S.C. §
1828(c)(3); see Bernstein, supra note 8, at 214.
48 12 U.S.C. §§ 18170)(7), 1828(c)(5), 1841(c).
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If the Fed rejects the proposed transaction, the DOJ's merger
review is presumably terminated.4 ' If the Fed approves the
transaction, then the DOJ has thirty days from the approval date
to challenge the merger by filing suit under the Clayton Act."
After these thirty days lapse, the DOJ can only sue to challenge
the merger under section 2 of the Sherman Act."
III. THE HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
The bank merger process is very complex and convoluted.
Merger analysis entails numerous levels of evaluation with varying
degrees of complexity. In an attempt to simplify and improve the
approval process, the DOJ has revised the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines.
A. A Five-Part Test
To fully understand the antitrust conflict between the DOJ
and the Fed, it is necessary to examine the provisions and effects
of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines that were issued on April 2,
1992.12 The Guidelines set forth a methodical framework for de-
termining whether or not horizontal mergers will be challenged
on antitrust grounds." The new Guidelines are intended to bene-
49 This determination is based on the traditional notion 'that the DOJ applies more
stringent standards. See Letzler & Mierzewski, supra note 2, at 1.
50 12 U.S.C. §§ 1828(c)(6), 1849(b)(1).
51 12 U.S.C. §§ 1828(c)(7), 1849(b)(1).
52 Former Assistant Attorney General James F. Rill has called the revised Guidelines
the DOJ's greatest accomplishment during his nearly three years as Chief of the Antitrust
Division. The DOJ and the FTC exchanged proposals for the revision for almost a year
before they were actually issued. Interview with Former Assistant Attorney General James F Rill,
.63 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1580, at 254 (Aug. 27, 1992).
Rill took office in July 1989 and sought to update the Guidelines to coincide with
contemporary antitrust cases that the DOJ brought to court. Ironically, judges often cited
the 1984 Guidelines in deciding against the DOJ, which Prompted the government to
undertake a complete revision of the merger framew6rk. Barbara Franklin, Trouble in
Merger City; Agency Rivalries Stall Revisions of Guidelines. N.Y. LJ., Jan. 9, 1992, at 5; see also
Neal IR Stoll & Shepard Goldfein, A Progress Report on Merger Enforcement, N.Y. UJ., Mar.
20, 1992, at 3 (reporting that Rill announced a redirection in merger enforcement).
53 See Antitrust Arquit Describes Enforcers' Experience Applying 1992 Horizontal Merger
Guides, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), Sept. 30. 1992, at 190; Justice Department, FTC Is-
sue Unified Federal Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers, 62 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 1559, at 404 (Apr. 2, 1992). According to the drafters of the 1992 Guidelines, the
revisions are not intended to bind the agency in its conduct of antitrust litigation. Neal
IR Stoll & Shepard Goldfein, The 1992 Merger Guidelines - Practical Advice, N.Y. LJ., May
19, 1992, at 3 ("In the litigation context, therefore, one can expect to see the usual
reliance on market share evidence."). However, very few cases are litigated because of the
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fit businesses by providing guidance for planning future merg-"
ers.54 According to the drafters, the Guidelines should enable
businesses to determine whether or not a proposed merger will be
challenged, and, if so, in what regard or in what capacity.5
The principal goal of the Guidelines is to ensure competition
in the post-merger environment which can be accomplished by
preventing excessive market power and evaluating market concen-
tration. Under the Guidelines, regulators assess market concen-
tration using the following five step process: (1) assessing market
concentration; (2) assessing the adverse competitive effects of that
market concentration; (3) assessing the timeliness, likeliness, and
sufficiency of entry to counter the adverse effects of decreased
competition; (4) assessing gains in efficiency that could not be
accomplished by other means; and (5) assessing whether or not a
company would ultimately fail if a particular merger were not
allowed.5" All mergers do not require the complete five step anal-
ysis. For instance, if a proposed transaction is found to be in a
"clearly unconcentrated" market, then analysis starts and stops with
the first step and the merger is approved."
B. Reaction to the Guidelines
The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines have received ample
commentary, both critical and otherwise, from the business, legal,
and regulatory communities. While the DOJ and the FTC have
repeatedly praised the utility of the new Guidelines as marked
improvements from prior horizontal merger standards,59 many in
expense involved and because the proposed transaction would be indefinitely delayed dur-
ing the litigation, thus defeating the purpose of the merger. Consequently, compliance
with the Guidelines is necessary, as a practical matter, for approval of a merger.
54 James F. Rill, An Antitrust Screen for Merger Masters of the 1990s, 27 MERGER AND
AcQuismONS 52, 54 (1992).
55 Id.
56 See Antitrust Merger Guidelines Receive Mixed Reaction; Merger Guidelines At a Glance,
NAT'L LJ., Apr. 20, 1992, at 19.
57 Id.
58 See Justice's Five-Factor Merger Test, ABA BANKING J., Aug. 1992, at 36.
59 Former FTC chairman Janet D. Steiger claimed the revised Guidelines were a
significant improvement in "substantive merger analysis." Antitrust Agency Heads Cite Guide-
lines as Major Administration Accomplishment, supra note 6, at 584; see generally Justice Depart-
ment and FTC Issue Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 6 (noting favorable comments
made by Rill and Former Attorney General William Barr).
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the banking and legal fields do not share in this enthusiasm. °
Rather, they view this new version as an unpredictable amalgam-
ation of loopholes that will lead to inconsistent regulatory actions.
Specifically, some critics fear that the DOJ will approve some pro-
posed transactions when the numbers, as well as the other criteria,
tend to indicate that a DOJ challenge is likely to occur based on
the analytic, case-by-case approach advanced in the Guidelines.6'
These critics fear that, at other times, the same or similar num-
bers and other criteria will be analyzed and lead the DOJ to chal-
lenge the proposed transaction."
Critics further note that the 1992 version no longer explicitly
states when a merger is likely to be challenged.63 Instead, the
Guidelines speak in terms of mergers that may raise competitive
concerns or that are presumptively likely to "create or enhance
market power or facilitate its exercise."' For some, the result is
that recent revisions "make it difficult to determine whether feder-
al merger enforcement policy has become more or less
stringent."'
Another problem with the Guidelines arises from the fact that
they are purposefully flexible rather than rigid. This flexibility
raises poteritial problems for practitioners, the DOJ, and the FTC,
especially with respect to ongoing application of the Guidelines.66
Specifically, regulators may use this flexibility to approve more
60 Michael A. Greenspan noted that the new Guidelines "make it more difficult for
merging banks to know the standards and seek to structure their deals." Division Officia4
Bank Counselor Cross Swords Over Bank Merger Reviews, 63 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 1572, at 17 (July 2, 1992). Thus, the end result will be increased costs in the
merger application process. Id.; see also Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Mary L.
Azcuenaga On the Issuance of Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 62 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 1559, at 450 (Apr. 2, 1992) [hereinafter Dissenting Statement] (opposing revi-
sions).
61 Dissenting Statement, supra note 60, at 450. Contra Stoll, supra note 52, at 3 (consis-
tent practice by the DOJ in disclosing enforcement rationale will foster predictability in
merger analysis).
62 See Dissenting Statement, supra note 60, at 450. Commissioner Azcuenaga noted that
the "government policy . . . may, in some situations encourage mergers that are likely to
be challenged and, in others, discourage efficient mergers . . . [which] will impose
costs." Id.
63 Neal FL Stoll & Shepard Goldfein, Merger Enforcement for the Nineties and Beyond
N.Y. LJ., -Apr. 21. 1992, at 3.
64 Id. (citing 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552).
65 Id.
66 Id.
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mergers than the drafters had anticipated or intended.6 1 Con-
versely, current regulators may use their discretionary power, af-
forded by the flexible approach, to disapprove mergers that the
drafters would have favored. Since the framework provides for a
high degree of subjectivity, future merger analysis could be
plagued by inconsistency.
IV. DISSECTING THE GUIDELINES
A. Market Definition, Measurement, and Concentration
As stated above, the 1992 Guidelines promulgate a five step
approach with respect to merger analysis. The first step involves
evaluation of the market by measuring structure and concentra-
tion. The first aspect of concentration analysis requires that the
appropriate market be defined.
1. Market Definition
A market is defined as:
a product or group of products and a geographic area in
which it is produced or sold such that a hypothetical profit-
maximizing firm, not subject to price regulation, that was the
only present and future producer or seller of those products in
that area likely would impose at least a small but significant
and nontransitory increase in price assuming the terms of sale
of all other products are held constant.ss
Therefore, a market is defined in terms of both a product market
and a geographic market. In the banking industry, product mar-
kets are determined by describing the products offered by finan-
cial institutions and recognizing where these products overlap. In
contrast, geographic markets consist of areas within which provid-
ers of the same type of product are subject to the same demands
by customers. This entails discovering where customers currently
obtain services, and where they would go if prices were in-
creased.69
In practice, defining the geographic market for banks may be
67 See id. ("[G]uidelines . . . [may] become subject to radical reinterpretation by the
drafters' successors.").
68 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,554, § 1.0.
69 Glassman. supra note 7, at 4.
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difficult, depending on the product market in question." If the
product market for large business customers is under evaluation,
the relevant geographic market could feasibly be the entire United
States. However, the product market for banks is usually com-
prised of banking services to individual consumers or to small and
mid-sized companies. 7' The relevant geographic market is more
limited for these product markets. According to one commentator,
"realistic approximations" of the relevant geographic market can
be discerned from "population densities, commuting patterns,
newspaper distribution routes, public transportation routes, and
toll-free telephone" numbers.72
2. Market Measurement
The next aspect of market analysis, market measurement,
significantly changed from the prior Guidelines. Market measure-
ment involves identifying the firms that participate in the relevant
market. The 1992 version of the Guidelines broadens the scope of
market measurement to include more market participants.' Spe-
cifically, uncommitted entrants, those who are not yet in the mar-
ket but may be within one year without incurring significant ex-
penditures, are included as market participants.74 Production
substituters (i.e., non-banks that offer substitute products) are also
included as market participants even though they are not currently
in the market, but may be, if within one year, they are likely to
alter production by producing the relevant products without incur-
ring significant costs.75
Lastly, all other supply responses, which could be newly orga-
nized firms or existing firms not currently in the production of
the relevant product, are included as market participants if, within
one year, they would be likely to produce the relevant product in
70 Id.
71 See Letzler & Mierzewski, supra note 2, at 3; Balto et al., supra note 2, at 11.
72 Glassman, supra note 7, at 4.
73 See 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,556-57, § 1.31.
74 Id. § 1.32.
75 James F. Rill, Speech Before ABA Section of Antitrust Law (Apr. 3. 1992). in 62 Anti-
trust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1560, at 485 (Apr. 9, 1992). Another example of a
supply side substitute includes the increasing use of commercial paper as a source of
financing. See David S. Neill, Economic Developments and International Finance 60 Banking
Rep. (BNA) 812 (May 31, 1993).
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response to small but significant nontransitory increases in pric-
es.7' In contrast, those firms with the technological capacity to
produce the relevant product are excluded from the scope of
market participation if they would not likely opt to enter the rele-
vant market." In measuring market participants, speed (the one
year requirement) and sunk cost (an expenditure that cannot be
recouped within one year) are of critical importance.
3. Market Concentration
The third aspect of market analysis is market concentration.
HHI measures market concentration and is broken down into
three benchmarks. An unconcentrated market is one with an HHI
of less than 1000. A moderately concentrated market has an
HHI between 1000 and 1800.' 9 Lastly, an HHI over 1800 is con-
sidered to be evidence of a highly concentrated market."0
In the banking arena, overall market concentration analysis
depends upon analysis of the product market. In United States v.
Philadelphia National Bank, the Supreme Court defined a banking
product market as a cluster of banking services."1 In comparison,
the DOJ segregates consumer from business banking markets, and
within business banking differentiates between small and middle
market companies on one hand, and large companies on the oth-
76 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. 57 Fed. Reg. 41,557, § 1.321: see Rill. supra
note 75, at 486.
77 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,556-57, § 1.32. Such firms are
excluded from analysis of market participants, but are included in analysis of entry.
78 Id. at 41,558, § 1.51(a). Definitions of market concentration levels have remained
relatively unchanged from prior Guidelines.
79 Id. § 1.51(b).
80 Id. § 1.51(c).
81 374 U.S. 321, 324-27 (1963) (ruling that a cluster of banking services includes
unsecured personal and business loans, mortgage loans, loans secured by securities or
accounts receivable, automobile installment and consumer goods installment loans); see
also United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974) (ruling that commer-
cial banking's cluster of products approach remained distinct from all other financial
institutions); Donald Baker, Financial Networks Avoid Antitrust Ills, NAT'L L.J., June 21.
1993, at 21 (in Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, the Supreme Court established the applicability of
antitrust laws to banking). Philadelphia Nat'l Bank marked the first antitrust suit filed by
the DOJ against the merger of commercial banks. See Lee B. David, Comment, Banking
Mergers-Is Banking Still A Distinct Line of Commerce?, 57 TUL. L. REv'. 958, 962 (1983).
Today, the Fed continues to utilize the "cluster" approach in defining the relevant
product market in banking. Calvani & Miller, supra note 29, at 130; see also David S.
Neill, Fed Antitrust Change Could Boost Thrift Acquisitions by Banks. BANKING POL'Y REP.,
Sept. 6, 1993, at 1 (the Fed is currently evaluating whether it should continue to use the
"clustering" approach); Neill, supra note 75 (same).
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er.82 The DOJ's differentiation of business markets is derived
from the fact that in a global economy, large business customers
have access to a variety of financing options.83 However, accord-
ing to the DOJ, the small and mid-sized business customers may
not enjoy this same variety.84 Accordingly, the DOJ has defined
the product market for small and mid-sized coinpanies differently,
thereby affecting the Department's overall conclusions about mar-
ket concentration.
These conclusions about market concentration represent
marked departures from prior Guidelines, which resulted in differ-
ences in evaluating the importance of HHI. 5 First, in the 1984
Guidelines the DOJ claimed that moderate to high market concen-
tration meant that the agency was "likely to challenge."" In con-
trast, the 1992 version indicates that a multiplicity of factors will
be taken into account in determining whether a merger will be
challenged.87 Similarly, under the 1984 Guidelines, if the post-
merger HHI increase in a moderately concentrated market was
less than 100 points, the Department was unlikely to sue.' The
1992 Guidelines describe the same situation more emphatically as
"unlikely to have adverse competitive consequences." 9 Similarly,
in the 1984 version, a highly concentrated market with a post-
merger incremental HHI increase of over 100 points indicated
that the DOJ was likely to sue, except in extraordinary circum-
stances." The 1992 Guidelines simply say that such an increase
82 See Lynn Adkins, Small Business: Antitrust Focus on Loan Availability, AM. BANKER,
May 27, 1992, at 6; see also, Banks Should Review New Guidelines on Mergers, Justice Dep't Ofi-
cial Says, 59 Banking Rep. (BNA) 1 (July 6, 1992); Banks Should Review New Guidelines on
Mergers, Justice Official Says, BNA BANKING DAILY, June 30, 1992. at 1.
83 Stephen A. Rhoades, Consolidation of the Banking Industry and the Merger Guidelines,
37 ANTITRUST BULL. 689, 690-91 (1992).
84 Id.
85 See Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 63, at 3 (suggesting HHI analysis has remained
unchanged from prior Guidelines).
86 1984 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,831. § 3.11(b).
87 As Charles A. James noted, the fundamental thrust of the 1992 Guidelines was to
.make a significant movement away from wooden adherence to structural standards and
tbward a .more balanced assessment of market conditions." Antitrust Agency Heads Cite
Guidelines As Major Administration Accomplishment, supra note 6, at 584.
88 1984 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,831, § 3.11(b); see Rill, supra
note 75, at 486.
89 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,558, § 1.51(b).
90 1984 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,831, § 3.11(c): see Rill, supra
note 75. at 486.
1994]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
may "potentially raise significant competitive concerns.""
These differences strongly indicate that market concentration,
standing alone, will not determine whether the DOJ will file an
antitrust suit. In the 1992 Guidelines, the DOJ recognizes the
fallibility of the HHI and acknowledges that "in some situations,
market share and market concentration data may either understate
or overstate the likely future competitive significance of a firm or
firms in the market or the impact of a merger. 92 The downside
of this flexible approach is that it is difficult to predict when the
HHI level is sufficient or when the DOJ will consider it to be too
high.
This shift in focus away from a strict numerical analysis of
market concentration to a "whole picture" approach epitomizes
the flexible methodology of the 1992 Guidelines. Under the new
framework, high market concentration is not necessarily disposi-
tive. However, the DOJ has not stated the extent to which mergers
will be favored where market concentration is high. Nor has the
DOJ stated how the factors that offset high HHI will be weight-
ed.9
3
This relaxation of merger policy with respect to market con-
centration marks another departure from the prior Guidelines. In
the past, it was believed that market concentration, or more pre-
cisely market structure, determined anticompetitive behavior. 4
The new Guidelines replace the idea that market structure signi-
fies the anticompetitiveness in the post-merger environment with
the idea that the conduct of firms determines
anticompetiiveness.95 Accordingly, the new Guidelines are based
91 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,558, § 1.51(c); see Rill, supra
note 75, at 486.
92 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,558, § 1.52.
93 For factors that can be used to offset high HHIs, see infra Part IV.B. An example
of the DOJ's relaxed view of the HHI is seen in the Fed's approval of Barnett Banks.
Inc.'s acquisition of 7L Corp. and First Florida Banks, Inc. The DOJ did not challenge
the merger even though market concentration was high. For example, in the Citrus
County market, pre-divestiture HHI was 2302 points, an increase of 539 points. Barnett's
willingness to divest itself of three branches brought the HHI down to 2093 points,
which, in the past. would have invoked a DOJ challenge to the transaction. Fed Approves
Barnett Acquisition As Justice Shows Flexibility on HHI, 59 Banking Rep. (BNA) 622, 623
(Nov. 2, 1992).
94 Rill, supra note 75, at 487.
95 Nonetheless, the DOJ still cautions that structure can influence the effect of con-
duct. Id. See Rill, supra note 54, at 52. Kenneth Scherer, an economic theorist who has
written extensively on the subject, is largely credited with this transition away from reli-
ance on market structure, and toward reliance on market conduct. Neal R. Stoll &
Shepard Goldfein, Administrative Changes: Fasten Your Seatbelts, N.Y. LJ., Nov. 21, 1989, at
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on the premise that, the conduct of firms determines possible
adverse effects of a merger through the exercise of market power
based on market concentration, 6 which brings merger analysis to
its second step.
B. The Potential Adverse Competitive Effects of Mergers
The structuralist approach of the past "assumed that adverse
effects flow ineluctably from increases in concentration."97 Today,
antitrust analysis proceeds on the assumption that conduct and
not structure determines the course of anticompetitive effects.
Thus, potential anticompetitive effects are given greater attention
now than in the past. Indeed, the 1992 Guidelines dedicate an
entire section to competition in the post-merger environment.
There, anticompetitive effects are broken down into two catego-
ries: coordinated interaction and unilateral activity.
1. Coordinated Interaction
The previous Guidelines defined anticompetitive effects largely
in terms of collusion. Central to the notion of collusion was the
concept of a cartel, in which a conglomeration of firms, acting
together, could dictate the local market.98 However, the DOJ no
longer views the existence of a cartel as necessary to adversely
affect the post-merger environment." Rather, the DOJ looks for
"coordinated interaction,""0 ' which is far broader and more inclu-
sive of overall anticompetitive effects than simple collusion.
The new Guidelines define "coordinated interaction" as con-
sisting of three factors.' First, terms of coordination, under
which similar firms act together, must exist.0 2 Second, a mecha-
nism to detect any deviation or differentiation from the terms of
3 n.21.
96 See Rill, supra note 75, at 486-87.
97 Id. at 487.
98 See Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 63, at 3.
99 Gregory Werden, former Senior Economist of the Antitrust Division and an au-
thor of the 1984 Guidelines, believes that repeated use of the word collusion has "misled
some commentators" because the, Guidelines did not require explicit collusion in order to
have an adverse impact on competition. Neal R. Stoll & Shepard Goldfein, A Decade of
Impressions, N.Y. LJ., Aug. 20, 1991, at 3.
100 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,558-59, § 2.1.
101 Rill, supra note 75, at 487.
102 Id.'
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coordination must exist. 3 Finally, punishment must be invoked
against those who deviate from the prescribed scheme of coordina-
tion. 104
In determining the existence of coordinated interaction, all
three elements do not have to be present for a negative impact
on competition to manifest. Indeed, "the terms of coordination
may be imperfect and incomplete . . and still result in significant
competitive harm.' 0 5 Kevin J. Arquit, former director of the
FTC's Bureau of Competition, noted: "When market share and
concentration data raise presumptive concerns regarding the mer-
ger, we will look carefully at evidence that market conditions make
coordinated interaction unlikely to occur or succeed."0 6 Howev-
er, he continued, "the [G]uidelines do not compel us to engage
in exhaustive polling of firms in the market to determine their
individual cost-benefit analyses of collusion versus cheating. "107
Coordinated interaction poses a real threat to banking compe-
tition. Prevalent throughout the industry is an informal manner of
cooperative pricing. Typically, when the Fed eases monetary policy
by lowering the federal funds rate, large banks react first by lower-
ing their prime lending rate. Such a rate reduction starts a domi-
no effect as smaller financial institutions quickly follow suit by
mimicking the prime rate at the larger institutions. This type of
coordinated activity could lead to anticompetitive problems in the
post-merger environment if large banks lowered their rates inde-
pendently of the Fed. In fact, large banks could effectively price
their smaller competitors out of the market. Such a situation
could create substantial predatory pressures as smaller financial
institutions exited the market, while a select number of bank hold-
ing companies controlled the market.'
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,559, § 2.11.
106 FTC Official Assures Bar of Flexibility In Using New CAidelines to Assess Mergers, 62
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1563. at 563, 564 (Apr. 30. 1992).
107 Id.
108 Suppose, for example, Bank A (a bank holding company) is formed by the com-
binations of Banks B and C. Post-merger. Bank A begins to lower its base lending rate
independent of the Fed's actions. To keep pace in the market, smaller financial institu-
tions begin to lower their rates. Bank A, as well as other bank holding companies within
the market, could offset lost margins associated with the rate reduction by increasing
prices on the products of their non-banking subsidiaries. However, smaller banks (as
opposed to bank holding companies) would be unable to offset losses associated with the
rate reduction.
The DOJ is also concerned about what would happen if the large bank increased
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2. Unilateral Activity
In addition to coordinated interaction, the DOJ also looks for
the existence of unilateral activity. Essentially, unilateral activity
creates anticompetitive effects where one firm is strong and large
enough to create the same adverse effect that would have resulted
had several firms coordinated their conduct."9 "A merger may
diminish competition even if it does not lead to increased likeli-
hood of successful coordinated interaction, because merging firms
may find it profitable to alter their behavior unilaterally following
the acquisition by elevating price and suppressing output.""'
(a) Substitute Products.-Any analysis of unilateral effect must
take into account substitute products. The market process through
which differentiated products can enter commerce via various
producers can be manipulated or disrupted by the unilateral exer-
cise of market power by a merged entity."' Accordingly, in a
market where the two best products remain with the same firm,
unilateral activity such as price increase can greatly affect buyer
behavior. In such a situation, product substitutes would gain atten-
tion as buyers switched to the next best product available in the
market. This could potentially hinder competition to a great ex-
tent.
For example, assume Bank A offers a line of credit that is
neither subject to annual review (by bank officials to determine
whether the creditworthiness of the customer remains at an ac-
ceptable level) nor annual clearance (where the credit facility.
its price. First. other banks might follow suit and increase their prices, thus resulting in a
situation of virtual coordination throughout the local industry. The DOJ encountered a
potential example of this and "considered whether market participants (i.e., smaller
banks) had the incentive and ability to expand their capacity to serve affected customers
with loans or depository services in response to a price increase and whether this capaci-
ty expansion was sufficient to make successful coordination unlikely." Guerin-Calvert &
Ordover, supra note 29, lat 668.
Second, the DOJ is concerned that the large bank (in the hypothetical) would exert
such force in the market that it could sustain a unilateral price increase without sacrific-
ing any customers regardless of the behavior of the smaller banks. Thus, if Bank A
raised its 'prices and maintained its customer base (which can be explained by a variety
of factors such as reputation of the bank and the prestige of being associated with it),
an anticompetitive result would manifest.
109 See Rill, supra note 54, at 52.
110 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,560, § 2.2.
111 See Rill, supra note 75, at 488.
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must be fully repaid for a specific amount of time). This line of
credit is comparably priced to lines offered by other banks. How-
ever, other banks require annual clearance for thirty consecutive
days and require that the line be reviewed annually. Hence, their
customers have to provide financial statements, accounts receivable
agings, and various other financial data for review on a more
frequent basis.
Next, assume that the absence of an annual review and annu-
al clearance requirement creates the perception that Bank A has a
far superior product. Then, Bank A begins to price its lines of
credit at rates higher than lines offered by other institutions. In-
stead of moving away from Bank A and utilizing credit facilities at
other financial institutions, some customers close their line of
credit and open a revolving line of credit at Bank A, thereby fund-
ing their working capital requirements. This revolver differs from
the original line of credit in that it has a lower rate and is subject
to annual review though not annual clearance. In practice, this
revolver has no better attributes than the lines of credit offered by
other banks, yet customers perceive a difference (since they do
not have to fully repay for a set time during the year) and switch
products rather than switch banks. The hypothetical result is a
situation with a monopolistic potential which could hinder compe-
tition. The exercise of this type of unilateral activity is what the
DOJ is trying to avoid.
This phenomenon of switching products rather than switching
banks is further encouraged by the fact that often a bank will
provide all of a customer's banking needs rather than merely
providing one or two products."' Switching banks is especially
cumbersome, since a customer must close all accounts at one
institution and then open new ones at a rival.
(b) Two Theories Of Unilateral Activity.-The DOJ employs two
distinct theories of unilateral activity. First, unilateral activity may
arise where the merged firms have two products that act as close
substitutes to one another and where the same firm produces the
two best products."' In that situation, the firm might raise the
price of one product. Some customers would be unwilling to bear
112 See Gregory Elliehausen & John Walker, Small Business Clustering of Financial Service
and the Definition of Banking Markets for Antitrust Analysis, 37 ANTITRUST BULL. 707, 735
(1992) (viewing commercial banking as a line of commerce since certain bank products
are "nearly always purchased as a cluster").
113 See Rill, supra note 75, at 488.
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the burden of the increased cost, and thus would switch to the
next best product. As a result, the merged entity would receive the
profit from the price increase without losing any customers, just
realigning them (toward the second best product)., 4 This cus-
tomer diversion, arising from a form of price discrimination, will
occur when other firms in the market lack the capacity to supply
the output necessary to restrain the price increase. Consumer
perception is vital to this theory since, in fact, the second best
product may be produced by another firm. However, this fact is
irrelevant if the consumer thinks that the second best- product
originates with the same firm that produces the best product."'
The second theory of unilateral activity relates to markets
where products are identical and the feature distinguishing com-
petitive firms is their capacity for production. In such a scenario, a
merged firm may find that decreasing output while simultaneously
increasing price is profitable because "the lost mark-ups on the
foregone sales may be outweighed by the resulting price increase
on the merged base of sales.... This would only. be successful if
alternative supply was not readily available either because compet-
itors lacked capacity to increase their supply or the market simply
lacked competitors. The DOJ advises that such unilateral activity is
unlikely if it would be more cost-efficient to'maintain existing
output.
1 7
Merging banks theoretically could engage in either theory of
unilateral activity. With regard to the first theory, banking prod-
ucts are highly substitutable both from the standpoint of credit
sources (term loans or leases) and deposit sources (one can invest
in a certificate of deposit or a money market fund). In a market
where one bank has significant market share, customers could
logically substitute products rather than switch to a different finan-
cial institution.
With regard to the second theory, in a market where one
bank has a fairly high, market concentration, the bank could de-
crease its output of loans to a particular sector (such as to small
114 See also id. ("WAhat formerly was an unprofitable strategy, now is a profitable strate-
gy because the merged firm has internalized or captured what used to be a diversion of
sales.").
115 See Stoll & Goldfein. supra note 63, at 3.
116 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, '57 Fed. Reg. 41,561, § 2.22; see Rill, supra
note 75, at 488.
117 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41.561. § 2.22: see Rill, supra
note 75, at 488.
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businesses), thereby diminishing the availability of financing. Next,
the bank could decrease costs by eliminating staff (which would
result in the same effect as if they had increased profits by in-
creasing prices), while reducing output of a certain product.
This second theory especially concerns the DOJ. For instance,
suppose Bank A merges with Bank B, creating a new, large entity
called Bank C. Prior to the merger, Banks A and B both actively
sought out small to mid-sized business banking customers. After
the merger, Bank C is larger and stronger and better able to ser-
vice large business clients. Such an endeavor is more profitable for
Bank C since Bank C could maintain a loan portfolio equal to the
size of the portfolios of both Bank A and Bank B but could em-
ploy fewer bankers (less personnel would be needed to service the
customer base since less customers exist). In such a scenario, the
small and mid-sized business customers are clearly the losers,
which is what the DOJ is trying to avoid by watching unilateral
actions that hinder competition.
C. Entry Analysis
Entry analysis is the third step in the revised merger analysis
process and its treatment in the 1992 Guidelines represents yet
another move away from a structural emphasis to a conduct ori-
ented focus. Under entry analysis, the DOJ considers whether or
not a prospect will be deterred from entering a market based on
the proposed merger, or whether the prospect's entry is likely and
will counteract some of the anticompetitive effects of the mer-
ger.118
Entry analysis for banking is unique in that under the Doug-
las Amendment, a state has the power to prevent out-of-state bank
holding companies from entering its borders."9 This law is a vi-
tal consideration in the DOJ's entry analysis.
1. Timeliness
The new Guidelines break entry analysis into three compo-
nents: timeliness, likeliness, and sufficiency. A prospect is consid-
ered timely if entry could transpire within two years of the mer-
ger. This two year period must include all phases of entry, begin-
ning with initial planning, which entails due diligence by the po-
118 Rill, supra note 75, at 488.
119 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d).
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tential entrant to determine whether or not to proceed with the
entry based on forecasts of profitability and feasibility. 0-
2. Likeliness
Next, the entry must be likely, which means economically
feasible in terms of a sunk cost analysis that evaluates capital ex-
penditures that could not be recouped within one year. 12
"[C]ompanies in industries such as financial services, for instance,
presumably would have fewer sunk costs and therefore would be
more likely to enter the market." 22 Specifically, the likeliness of
entry is measured by comparing the minimum viable scale of entry
at pre-merger prices against a hypothetical five percent reduction
in. output.
2
The minimum viable scale is defined as "the smallest average
annual level of sales that the committed entrant must persistently
achieve for profitability at pre-merger prices."1 24 To simplify, this
means that regulators predict a five percent reduction in output
by the merged entity, which in banking means a five percent re-
duction in credit availability. To offset this reduction, an entrant
must be able to provide ample supply (by providing financial ser-
vices and products). However, if the minimum level of sales need-
ed to sustain the prospective entrant exceeds potential sales
(which is assumed to coincide with the reduction in output from
the merged entity), then entry is unlikely since it would not be
profitable for the entrant to move into the market.2 As a result
of entry analysis, the relationship between estimated scale of entry
and hypothetical reduction in output is highly significant. 26
120 See Rill. supra note 75, at 488.
121 See Rill, supra note 54, at 56.
122 Franklin, supra note 52, at 5.
123 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. 57 Fed. Reg. 41,562, § 3.3 n.32.
124 Id. § 3.3; see Rill, supra note 75, at 489.
125 "Prospective entrants" refers to committed entrants. The primary distinction be-
tween committed entrants and uncommitted entrants is based upon the step in the mer-
ger analysis process in which they are evaluated. Uncommitted entrants are included in
market share analysis as market participants. Committed entrants, however, are excluded
from market share analysis but included in entry analysis because they are potential fu-
ture entrants. See Rill, supra note 54, at 56-57.
126 The five percent standard is an untested assumption, which has caused Azcuenaga
to fear that in practice, the degree of precision required to appropriately measure the
likelihood of entry may be unattainable. Dissenting Statement, supra note 60, at 451. She
has further commented that the incorporation of an untested assumption into the Guide-
lines was premature. Id. Azcuenaga's point is quite valid. For instance, assume regulators
postulate that the hypothetical five percent decrease in output is a likely result of the
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3. Sufficiency
The third component of entry analysis, sufficiency, evaluates
the overall effect of multiple entrants. In broad terms, sufficiency
analysis is a regulatory escape mechanism. "Sufficiency . . . [essen-
tially] requires that entry be of a character and scope that is re-
sponsive to the competitive effect of concern." '27 For instance, if
an entrant is deemed to be likely, then the sufficiency require-
ment is automatically met. But when a particular entrant is
deemed to be unlikely, then the sufficiency component allows
regulators to nevertheless approve the merger based on the overall
effect of multiple entrants. This could happen where market con-
centration is high and where a realistic entrant is nonexistent. If
regulators want to approve the merger, they could do so in terms
of potential sufficiency of multiple entrants and their presumed
combative effect against restrained competition.
Overall, entry analysis in the 1992 Guidelines appears to be
an improvement over the 1984 Guidelines; which simply said that
"if entry into the market is so easy that existing competitors could
not succeed in raising price for any significant period of time, the
Department is unlikely to challenge mergers in that market."128
This nebulous directive was difficult to apply."2 The three-part
analysis in the 1992 Guidelines was a needed clarification and
should enable regulators to more clearly identify a committed
merger. Assume further analysis indicates that a possible entrant could maintain a mini-
mum level of annual sales that would result in four percent of the market share. Hence,
the minimum viable scale test favors the entrant, and regulators would thereby approve
the merger on the basis that entry is likely. However, a committed entrant may still be
engrossed in the initial planning phase at the time the merger is approved. As the pro-
spective entrant continues with due diligence, it is ascertained that the minimum viable
scale is indeed four percent. Meanwhile, the merged entity has reduced output by a
mere two percent, rather than the anticipated five percent. The entrant then acknowledg-
es the impracticality of entry and aborts the plan to enter the market. The result: com-
petition is hindered as entrants are deterred from entering the market.
127 Rill, supra note 75, at 489. The scope of entry may be deemed to be sufficient
based upon the source of the anticompetitive concern. See Stoll & Goldfein, supra note
63, at 3. For instance, if the concern arose from a unilateral price increase by the
merged entity and an entrant's product was such that it could disrupt what would other-
wise be a loss of sales (from the price increase), then such scope of entry would likely
be deemed sufficient. Rill, supra note 75, at 489.
128 Rill, supra note 75, at 488 (citing 1984 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed.
Reg. 26.832, § 3.3).
129 See Rill. supra note 54, at 56: see also Rand McQuin. More Direction Required from
DOJ Merger Guidelines. N.Y. L.J., Sept. 11, 1989. at 39 (criticizing the DOJ's 1984 Merger
Guidelines).
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entrant. Moreover, in the event that a committed entrant is not
easily identifiable, regulators have the flexibility to approve a
merger based on the potential for multiple entrants.
D. Efficiencies
The fourth step in the merger process considers efficiencies
and gains therefrom. This step of the analysis has undergone little
change from the 1984 Guidelines, apart from the burden of proof
required. The 1984 Guidelines required merging entities to pro-
vide "clear and convincing" evidence of efficiencies.' In the
1992 Guidelines -the language requiring "clear and convincing"
proof is gone. FTC Commissioner Mary L. Azcuenaga (the sole
dissenter to the Guidelines) has argued that the omission means
there has been no change from prior policy.13' However, she ex-
pressed concern that some regulators may interpret the omission
as indicative that clear and convincing evidence is no longer re-
quired.3 2 In contrast, former Assistant Attorney General James F.
Rill has expressed the view that a lesser burden of proof is now
sufficient.'
Presumably, Rill is correct and the DOJ will evaluate proposed
gains in efficiencies under a lesser burden of proof than required
in the past. Aspects of efficiencies to be considered include econo-
mies of scale, enhanced integration of production facilities, trans-
portation costs, and/or plant specialization." Although gains in
efficiencies are somewhat easier to prove, any gain will be dis-
counted if regulators believe that an out-of-market participant
could achieve the same or similar gains. 5 Essentially, the DOJ
has discretion to disregard potential efficiencies of scale in the
horizontal merger setting if a merger between two firms who do
not already compete in the same market could reach the same
efficient results.
Attaching significance to gains in efficiencies is yet another
130 1984 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,834, § 3.5.
131 Dissenting Statement, supra note 60, at 451.
132 Id.
133 Rill, supra note 75, at 489.
134 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,562, § 4.
135 Rill, supra note 54, at 57. Gains in efficiencies for banks have traditionally been
analyzed as reductions in overhead such as rent and wages. Edward Dillon, A Better Gauge
of Merger Success: Looking at Net Operating Expenses, AM. BANKER, Dec. 8. 1993, at 4. Howev-
er, a merger's effect on net operating expense is increasingly seen as a more accurate
method of analysis. Id.
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mechanism that allows regulators to approve a merger that other-
wise would be challenged on grounds of hindered competition.
The check in this discretionary power is seen in the addition to
the Guidelines that regulators "will reject claims of efficiencies if
equivalent or comparable savings can reasonably be achieved by
the parties through other means.
E. Failing Firms
The fifth and final step in the merger analysis process applies
only to merger applicants that are in imminent danger of financial
failure.1 37 The importance of this prong is diminished in the
bank merger context. In the 1984 as well as the 1992 Guidelines,
the first three prongs in failing firm evaluation remain intact.
However, the 1992 Guidelines differ by adding a fourth prong.
First, in order to invoke the failing firm doctrine, the merging
firm must establish that it cannot meet its financial obligations in
the near future.138 Second, the firm must establish that it cannot
successfully reorganize under Chapter 11.' 9 Third, the firm must
establish that it has made unsuccessful good faith efforts to elicit
other reasonable offers. 4 ' The fourth factor, new in the 1992
Guidelines, requires the firm to establish that, without approval, its
assets would leave the market. 4' This last prong effectively re-
quires proof that'no alternative purchaser of the assets exists. 4 '
In the 1984 Guidelines, a proposed transaction was deemed
unlikely to create, enhance, or facilitate the exercise of market
136 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552, § 4. The DOJ has high-
lighted three reasons for this rejection: (1) accurate evidence of merger related cost
saving is frequently not available: (2) efficiencies may not be recognized until the future:
and (3) the parties are often unable to articulate their method of efficiency without
giving rise to a conflict of interest. Guerin-Calvert & Ordover, supra note 29, at 683.
137 Rill, supra note 54, at 52.
138 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41.563, § 5.1.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 The alternative purchaser theory played a role in the Fleet-Norstar acquisition of
New Maine National Bank, which had previously been a subsidiary of Bank of New Eng-
land. Maine's bank was in danger of failing, yet the DOJ discounted the failing firm
defense since such a merger would have adversely affected competition, and other bid-
ders did exist. Eventually, the merger was consummated after the merged entity agreed
to divestitures. Andrew L. Sandier, Mergers and the Justice Department. AM. BANKER. Oct. 29,
1991. at 4: see also Maine Antitrust Official Criticizes Fed on Antitrust Enforcement in Bank
Mergers, BNA BANKING DAILY, Apr. 2, 1992, at I (Maine's Deputy Attorney General
claimed that both the Fed and the DOJ misapplied the failing firm defense.).
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power if the merger candidate was in imminent danger of failure
if the merger was not approved.' This language created confu-
sion because, in the past, companies construed a weak financial
condition to indicate that anticompetitive effects would be ig-
nored.44 Federal Trade Commissioner Janet D. Steiger believes
that the addition of the fourth prong in the 1992 Guidelines will
alleviate some of the misunderstandings of the past since there is
a big difference between a "weak financial position ... [and]
imminent failure."14
5
V. FED/DOJ MERGER STANDARDS
A. Where They Disagree
In light of the dual levels of regulatory scrutiny that banks are
subject to in accomplishing a merger, it is a wonder that banking
combinations ever occur. Even more amazing is that, of the nearly
two thousand bank merger applications"' reviewed each year be-
tween 1990 and 1992, only fqur were challenged on antitrust
grounds.4 ' According to one commentator, Edward C. Ettin, this
staggering number of approvals is explained by ,the fact that the
thoroughness of the review process probably deters banks from
filing merger applications that would "clearly be
anticompetitive." '  Ettin believes that the self-screening process is
highly effective, which relieves the agencies of having to unneces-
143 See 1984 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed.*Reg. 26,837, § 5.1.
144 Janet D. Steiger. Speech Before ABA Section of Antitrust Law (Apr. 2, 1992), in 62
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1560, at 490 (Apr. 9, 1992).
145 Id.
146 This number encompasses mergers. consolidations, and acquisitions. Rill Says No
Change In Law Is Necessary To Address Megamergers, supra note 33: see Rill, supra note 54, at
53.
147 The most recent notable challenge was the Society/Ameritrust merger, which was
approved by the Fed on February 13, 1992. The DOJ expressed concern that Cleveland's
business would be negatively affected by the proposed combination. As a result, the DOJ
did not approve the merger until March 16, 1992, after Society agreed to divest $1 bil-
lion in branch deposits to Star Bank N.A. See United States v. Society Corp. and
Ameritrust Corp., 57 Fed. Reg. 10,371; Baxter, supra note 33; Competitive Factors Dominate
First Quarter 1992 Regulatory Actions, supra note 33; Letzler & Mierzewski, supra note 2, at
2; Society Corporation, Cleveland, Ohio: Order Approving the Acquisition of a Bank Holding Com-
pany, 78 FED. REs. BULL 302 (1992); Antitrust Division Resolves S. 7 Concerns Regarding
Acquisition in Banking Sector, 62 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1558, at 374, 375
(Mar. 26, 1992); Society Corp. Agrees to $1 Billion Deposit Sale, Bloomberg Newswire, Mar.
16, 1992; Fed Approves Society-Ameritrust Merger Over Objections of Justice Departmen4 62 Anti-
trust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1553, at 223 (Feb. 20, 1992).
148 Statement, supra note 33, at 263.
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sarily review unmeritorious merger applications. 4 1
Nevertheless, the DOJ and the Fed do disagree over antitrust
issues, which causes tension between the two agencies. When the
agencies disagree on antitrust concerns, the Fed generally must
give way to the DOJ pursuant to statutory mandates that govern
the course of mergers. 5 ° The DOJ is ultimately responsible for
ensuring the integrity of the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Clay-
ton Act, which can be accomplished by merger applicants'
compliance with the DOJ's Merger Guidelines.' Hence, the
DOJ's application of the 1992 Guidelines is dispositive of bank
mergers.
1. Definition Of Product Market
In recent times, a major point of contention between the DOJ
and the Fed with regard to antitrust policy has been the DOJ's
reliance on small to mid-sized business loans in defining relevant
product market.'52 This point of contention was seen in the
merger between Society Corporation and Ameritrust Corporation
149 Id.
150 See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
151 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,553, § 0. However, "it is not
possible to remove the exercise of judgment from the evaluation of mergers under the
antitrust laws." Id..
152 In 1990, for the first time in five years, the DOJ challenged a proposed bank
merger, that of First Hawaiian, Inc. and First Interstate Hawaiian, Inc. The DOJ was con-
cerned with the probable adverse competitive effect of the transaction. The DOJ arrived
at this conclusion as it departed from its tradition of defining the relevant market in
terms of a cluster of banking services and instead analyzed the product market in terms
of small and mid-sized business banking services. Sandler, supra note 142, at 6. See Balto
et al., supra note 2, at 11. The DOJ's focus on small to mid-sized business banking servic-
es and products was rejected in the only reported case in which the DOJ utilized the
concept of business services as the relevant product market. See United States v. Central
State Bank, 817 F.2d 22 (6th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 891 F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1989) (table opin-
ion).
The emphasis on small to mid-sized business loans has led to an overall change in
the procedures the DOJ uses to conduct merger review. In the past, the DOJ analyzed
bank mergers by perusing regulatory filings and supplementing such data by telephone or
personal interviews with customers and competitors. Letzler & Mierzewski, supra note 2, at
1. Now, the DOJ demands substantial documentation from the merging banks as well as
from rival banks. Id. The DOJ now completes a more thorough process of interviewing
customers and competitors. Id.
Rill expressed his intent that merger analysis move away from using "opinion polls"
as evidence in determining whether or not the proposed transaction should proceed.
Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 53. The 1992 Guidelines are silent on the role of customer
commentary and it appears that Rill's intent has not been fully implemented, because
customer testimony does have an effect on the approval process. See generally Dan Shin-
gler. City Looks for More Lending Agreements, GRAINS CLEVEL-ND Bus., Jan. 13, 1992, at 1.
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where a dispute between the Fed and the DOJ arose over the
applicable product market.'53 The Fed's merger analysis focused
on the traditional cluster of banking services.'54 The DOj's analy-
sis focused on supply of and demand for credit to small and mid-
sized businesses.'
55
This small to mid-sized business market was first explicitly de-
scribed as the relevant product market by Margaret E. Guerin-
Calvert, Assistant Chief of the Antitrust Division's Economic Regu-
latory Section, at a Federal Reserve conference in Chicago. 5 6
Her remarks made one point quite clear, namely, that the DOJ
will scrutinize bank mergers for their effect on small business
customers because there are relatively few suppliers to meet the
credit needs of this market.5
Lending to such companies is a core part of a bank's business
and is typically h very profitable marketing segment. However,
some middle market business customers have been foreclosed
from credit availability. The bottom line is that small and mid-
sized companies have felt the impact of the "credit crunch" as
153 Competitive Factors Dominate First Quarter 1992 Regulatory Actions, supra note 33, at
10.
154 See Society Corporation, Cleveland, Ohio: Order Approving the Acquisition of a Bank
Holding Company, supra note 147, at 304; United States v. Society Corp. and Ameritrust
Corp., 57 Fed. Reg. 10,371; Fed Approves Society-Ameritrust Merger Over Objections of Justice
Department, 62 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1553. at 223, 224 (Feb. 20, 1992).
155 See Society Corporation, Cleveland, Ohio: Order Approving the Acquisition of a Bank
Holding Company, supra note 147: United States v. Society Corp. and Ameritrust Corp., 57
Fed. Reg. 10,371; Fed Approves Society-Ameitrust Merger Over Objections of Justice Department.
supra note 154.
156 Adkins, supra note 82, at 6.
157 Id. Prior to Guerin-Calvert's speech. the availability of low income mortgage lend-
ing "was seen as the most sensitive regulatory barrier to [bank] merger[s]." Id.
Generally, most bankers disagree that small business lending should be scrutinized
so closely for antitrust reasons. Bankers note that each loan is unique and requires the
evaluation. of a multiplicity of factors, and for that reason, large (merged) banks have no
advantage over small banks and thrifts. Id. Similarly, H. Rodgin Cohen has vigorously dis-
agreed with the DOJ's reliance on small business lending availability by noting that in"
fact "competitive alternatives are extremely broad for small businesses . . . ." Adkins,
supra note 82, at 6. He supports this theory by arguing that small business gets ample
credit from its suppliers in the form of extended payment plans and in the form of leas-
ing options for what would otherwise be capital expenditures. Id.
Cohen also believes that small businesses are favorably affected by banking consoli-
dations, rather than harmed by them. He claims that small community banks can revital-
ize a local distressed economy when they are owned by large commercial banks. Hence,
the smaller institutions benefit in that the larger institutions can more readily supply the
necessary capital. H. Rodgin Cohen, Changes on Horizon; Lauyers Predict Boost in Business
Under Clinton. N.Y. LJ., Nov. 12, 1992, at 5.
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banks have tightened their credit standards.'58 For this reason,
the DOJ ascribes great importance to this area because "sources of
credit for small businesses have been diminishing rapidly in some
markets," said Guerin-Calvert.'59 The Fed strongly disagrees with
the DOJ's analysis and claims that the DOJ failed to provide suffi-
cient evidence of the reliance on this product market in the Soci-
ety/Ameritrust merger.6 °
2. Definition Of Geographic Market
Disagreement over the relevant product market has led to
other agency differences. Based on different views of the product
market, the Fed and the DOJ's determinations as to geographical
concentration often differ. In the Society/Ameritrust merger, for
example, the Fed concluded that the two product markets for
clusters of banking services where concentration level was relatively
high were in Ashtabula County, Ohio, and Starke County, Indi-
ana. 6' In Ashtabula County, post-merger and post-divestiture of
four Ameritrust branches would have resulted in HHI of 1851, an
81 point increase.'62 In Starke County, Ameritrust's only branch
was divested and resulted in no net change in HHI' 63 Converse-
ly, the DOJ concluded there was high concentration in two Ohio
markets, namely Cuyahoga County and Lake County,'64 based on
a narrower product market that was comprised of non-mortgage
commercial loans, commercial loans, commercial demand deposit
accounts, cash and coin, lockbox, cash management, and expert
158 As President Clinton's goal to ease the credit crunch on small business continues
to materialize, definition of relevant product market may have to be reformulated. See
Neill, supra note 75, at 812 (Clinton's proposals may create excess lending capacity with
the rise of securitization and use of commercial paper); see also John P. LaWare, Statement
before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of the Comm. on Gov't Opera-
tions in the U.S. House of Rep, reprinted in 79 FED. RES. BuLL. 466 (1993) (highlighting five
areas of focus in order to reduce credit crunch). See generally Bank and Thrift Agencies
Issue Polity Reducing Loan Documentation Standards, 60 Banking Rep. (BNA) 449 (Apr. 5,
1993).
159 Adkins, supra note 82, at 6.
160 Banks Should Review New Guidelines on Magers, Justice Dep't Official Says, supra note
82, at 1.
161 Competitive Factors Dominate First Quarter 1992 Regulatory Actions, supra note 33, at
10.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Antitrust Division Resolves S. 7 Concerns Regarding Acquisition in Banking Sector, supra
note 147, at 375.
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business advice." In the end, the Society/Ameritrust merger was
approved after the merging banks agreed to massive divesti-
tures. 166
3. Other Differences
I
Another aspect of merger analysis over which the DOJ and
the Fed disagree concerns supply and substitute bank products. In
an analysis of substitute bank products, the Fed looks closely to
the marketplace to discover who is providing financial services and
products. 6  The Fed considers banks and bank holding compa-
nies, as does the DOJ. However, the Fed also considers the supply
response and the impact of non-bank financial institutions such as
finance companies, savings and loan institutions, and credit un-
ions." In contrast, the DOJ will only consider a thrift to ,be a
market participant if it is currently providing the relevant product
or if it is an uncommitted entrant.69
B. Where They Agree: Divestiture
.Divestitures are a common precondition of banking mergers
since they serve as a relatively simple remedy to cure potential
anticompetitive effects of mergers. Although the Fed and the DOJ
may disagree over what constitutes the relevant product market,
one reason that both agencies ultimately end up approving the
merger is due to divestiture. Specifically, both the Fed and the
165 Id.
166 Glassman, supra note 7, at 4; see Division Finds Most Bank Mergers Do Not Create
Competitive Problems, supra note 33, at 809 (noting that divestiture is cure for
anticompetitive problems); see also supra note 33. Michael A. Greenspan, former Assistant
General Counsel for the Fed, noted that the Society divestitures were different than past
divestitures because the Fed typically allows the merger applicant to determine which
branches to divest. Here, divestitures were dictated by the Fed and the DOJ. Fed Approves
Society-Ameritrust Merger over Objections of Justice Department, supra note 154, at 224.
167 See Statement, supra note 33, at 263.
168 Id.; see also Balto et al.. supra note 2, at 12. See generally Antitrust Implications of
Bank Mergers and the Role of Several States In Evaluating Recent Mergers: Hearing Before the
House of Rep. Comm. on Banking Finance and Urban Affairs. 102d Cong., 2nd Sess. 3 (1992)
(statement of Carol Smith, Chief of the Antitrust Division, State of Washington, regarding
role of thrifts in merger analysis).
169 In practice, the DOJ rarely considers thrifts as market participants. On those occa-
sions when thrifts are included in market concentration calculations, the DOJ typically as-
signs thrifts 20% of the weight afforded a commercial bank. In contrast, the Fed typically
accords thrifts at least 50%, and as much as 100%, of the weight afforded commercial
banks. Sandier, supra note 142, at 5; see also Neill, supra note 81 (the Fed contemplates
changing general methodology with regard to evaluation of thrift acquisitions).
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DOJ agree that appropriate divestitures will lessen potential
anticompetitive problems with respect to all product markets, how-
ever defined.'
The Society/Ameritrust merger is just one example of how
the Fed and the DOJ cari and do disagree. Such disagreement also
arose in the First Hawaiian, Inc. acquisition of First Interstate
Hawaiian, Inc., and in the acquisition by the Fleet-Norstar Finan-
cial Group of Bank of New England's subsidiaries. The Fed ap-
proved both these mergers, but the DOJ challenged them as re-
straining competition for small to mid-sized business custom-
ers.17' Later, both mergers were amicably resolved when the
banks agreed to divestitures. 7 2 Essentially, divestiture is effectively
used to resolve conflicts between the DOJ and the Fed.
C. Evaluation of Bank Merger Standards
The DOJ claims that uniformity in merger analysis was the
intent of the revised Guidelines.7 3 Yet, if the DOJ and the Fed
cannot even agree on the definitional components (i.e., product
market, geographic market, and market participants) of merger
standards, it is difficult for bank officials to know which definitions
to apply and which mergers will be challenged. The overall thrust
of the DOJ's Guidelines seems to be that the DOJ will allow more
mergers than in the past since the focus is no longer on strict
adherence to HHI. But the resulting agency disagreement over
bank merger analysis shows that the approval process is still
shrouded in considerable confusion. To dissipate this confusion,
the Guidelines would be more helpful if they contained a special
section on bank mergers and if the DOJ gave clearer guidance on
how relevant product markets are to be defined.
In sum, the 1992 Guidelines do provide tangible improve-
ments over earlier versions, such as section 2 of the Guidelines,
which relaxed the old exclusive focus on HHI. Further im-
provements include stylistic considerations in that the 1992 Guide-
lines are more concise and refined. Nonetheless, this new, flexible
approach has spawned uncertainty about what standards apply (as
seen in the DOJ's and the Fed's disagreements) to various steps of
170 See Fed Approves Sociep-Ameritrust Merger over Objections of Justice Department, supra
note 154, at 224.
171 Id. at 225.
172 Id.
173 See Justice Department and FTC Issue Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 6.
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bank merger analysis. Thus, the DOJ's new merger standards with
regard to bank mergers are better than past standards. However,
room for further improvement remains, since the DOJ standards
are not specifically banking oriented.
VI. ELIMINATING REDUNDANCY: A PROPOSAL
In many respects, bank merger analysis is a wasteful redun-
dancy. It is repetitive to have two government agencies expend
vast amounts of time, energy, and taxpayer money for the same
end through essentially the same means. The overall similarities in
philosophies and analytical frameworks between the Fed and the
DOJ in merger analysis raise a serious question, namely, whether it
is necessary to have both organizations conduct essentially the
same due diligence. One commentator, Michael Greenspan, has
advocated amendments to the Clayton and Sherman Acts that
would give bank agencies sole authorization to approve mergers,
thus removing jurisdiction from the DOJ 4
It makes sense that only one agency should undertake the
task of reviewing bank merger applications. Other industries are
only subject to one merger review (that done by the DOJ). Such a
singular review should be conducted by the agency with the most
expertise in the industry.
There are several reasons for the Fed to have sole jurisdiction.
First, the Fed's overriding purpose is to promote the safety and
soundness of the banking industry, whereas the DOJ's purpose is
to minimize anticompetitive effects. Second, the Fed's expertise is
industry-specific, whereas the DOJ's merger review is general and
employed across all lines of industry. Third, the Fed, as an inde-
pendent agency, is somewhat immune from political pressures,
whereas the DOJ's philosophies mirror those of the administration.
Fourth, the Fed and the DOJ undertake similar merger review,
which is a wasteful and redundant use of resources. 5 Indeed,
174 Division Official, Bank Counselor Cross Swords Over Bank Merger Reviews, supra note
60, at 17; see also Banks Should Review New Guidelines on Mergers, Justice Official Says, supra
note 82 (remarks by Guerin-Calvert show that the DOJ and the Fed generally agree on
most issues, which strengthens Greenspan's proposal for a Congressional amendment giv-
ing the bank agencies authority for approvals on bank mergers).
175 This redundancy is apparent in the Fed and the DOJ's similarities in merger
review, which include analysis of HHI, market concentration, anticompetitive effects, and
efficiencies. See supra notes 38-49 and accompanying text; see also Guerin-Calvert &
Ordover, supra note 29, at 673 ("In large part the framework for analysis and focus of
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between 1300 and 2000 transactions are reviewed by the DOJ each
year, yet rarely are these challenged.'76
Currently, the Fed and the DOJ conduct independent, yet
parallel merger reviews. For instance, in every transaction where
the Fed has jurisdiction, many efforts are undertaken to ensure
competition in the post-merger environment.' The Fed, as the
regulator of banks and banking, has a vested interest in ensuring
that the safety and soundness of the banking industry is furthered
by banking mergers. As Federal Reserve Governor John LaWare
remarked: "The Board has made clear its general policy that insti-
tutions seeking approval for expansionary applications must be
soundly capitalized and that mergers and acquisitions should result
in even stronger and better capitalized institutions."178
Consequently, "the weakened condition of many banks as a
result of bad loans here and abroad, the decline of U.S. banks
among the world leaders, and a weakening U.S. economy,""'
have created a need for domestic banking consolidation.' Bank-
ing in the 1980s was plagued by deregulation and saturation. The
excess capacity led to a virtual banking crisis. For this reason, the
Fed actively advocates a healthy, well-capitalized banking environ-
ment. This can best be accomplished by allowing banking consoli-
dations to occur in the course of business.
Furthermore, the approach to merger analysis undertaken by
the Fed is banking specific. In contrast, the DOJ's Guidelines are
drafted for general horizontal mergers and are not tailored to the
banking industry. Accordingly, the Fed's familiarity with and close
supervision of the banking industry is further support for the
proposition that sole jurisdiction over banking consolidations
should lie with the Fed.
concerns is very similar as between the Department and the Federal Reserve Board.").
176 Guerin-Calvert & Ordover. supra note 29, at 669. The DOJ rarely challenges merg-
ers of banks in separate geographic markets or mergers of smaller banks. Id.; see also
Calvani & Miller. supra note 29 (only in-market mergers will be subject to intense re-
view).
177 Statement, supra note 33, at 263-64.
178 John P. LaWare, Statement before the Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
in the U.S. Senate, reprinted in 78 FED. RES. BULL. 597, 600 (1992); see Donna Smith, Fed's
Lallare Sees Mergers Strengthening Banks. Reuters, Jan. 24, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Omni File.
179 Rhoades. supra note 83, at 689; see Calvani & Miller, supra note 29, at 127 (com-
paring United States banks in relation to international banks).
180 Contra EDWARD HILL & ROBERT VAUGHN, BANKING ON THE BRINK: THE TROUBLED
FUTURE OF AMERICAN FINANCE ch. 4 (1992) (United States banks no longer hold a posi-
tion among the largest in the world, but dominate in profits).
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Stephen Rhoades, Chief 'of Financial Structure for the Fed,
has completed an in-depth investigation into whether or not exist-
ing antitrust laws (and the manner in which they are applied by
the DOJ) impede banking consolidation."' Rhoades focused on
an HHI numerical analysis as well as consideration of various oth-
er factors to determine how the DOJ would act with regard to
situations exceeding HHI safe harbors. He concluded: "In view of
these findings, it does not appear that the antitrust laws are a
significant impediment to consolidation in the banking indus-
try."'82 This analysis strengthens the position that sole jurisdiction
of banking mergers should remain with the Fed. If, as Rhoades
poses, the DOJ does not impede consolidation, why require the
costly, time-consuming, and redundant effort of the DOJ?' 3 The
inclusion of the DOJ in the overall promotion of the Fed's goals
is repetitive and unnecessary.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Fed's goal is to promote the safety and soundness of the
banking industry. The DOJ's goal is to ensure that competition is
fostered in the marketplace. In essence, "the DOJ's global goal is
implicitly incorporated into the Fed's industry-specific goal. Al-
though the Fed is recognized as the banking industry expert, it
must defer to the DOJ in merger analysis. This results in a situa-
tion where the Fed is thwarted from accomplishing its objectives,
as it must accept a secondary position to an agency lacking bank-
ing expertise. In' past situations, industry nuances appreciated by
the Fed have remained unrecognized by the DOJ (as evidenced by
the fact that the Fed has approved mergers which the DOJ later
challenged).
Realistically, amendments to the Clayton and Sherman Acts
181 See Rhoades, supra note 83, at 690.
182 Id. at 705.
183 The redundancy in a literal sense has been appreciated by, the agencies them-
selves. Indeed, throughout the last few decades the trend has been that only one agency
predominates' on the banking merger scene. "In the 1960's and early 1970's. the [DOJI
was the ultimate controlling force on horizontal bank mergers." but then the Fed re-
placed the DOJ as the dominating force until 1990. Baker, supra note 32, at 651; see also
Baker, supra note 81, at 21 (the Fed turned dom bank mergers during the 1960s and
early 1970s).
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are not imminently forthcoming.'84 Until the time comes when
Congress does recognize the redundancy of the DOJ and the Fed
in evaluating bank mergers, the DOJ should defer to the Fed in
approving such consolidations. The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines legitimately pave the way for the DOJ's deference to the Fed.
Gina M. Killia"
184 The likelihood of such.amendments in the near future is, at best, slim. However,
realistic and practical joint initiatives are likely to occur in the near future. Indeed, bank
merger experts have suggested that the Fed and the DOJ work together in order to
make the process of "bank consolidations simpler and more efficient." Bank Merger Experts
Offer Tips on Murky Scene for Acquisitions. 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1629.
at 293 (Aug. 26. 1993). Specifically, a panel of bank merger specialists recommended that
the agencies "team up for a comprehensive review of all present geographic bank market
definitions." Id.
* The author would like to thank Patricia McCoy for her assistance and guidance
during the early stages of this Note.
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